INDUCTIVE RULE CLASSES OF GÖDEL ALGEBRAS

Rodrigo Nicolau Almeida – ILLC-UvA September 12, 2023

What are Π_2 -rules?

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- Provide an algebraic/model theoretic framework to analyse these rules similar to varieties/quasivarieties.
- Use it to study these rules for Gödel Algebras.

Will focus on single-conclusion consequence relations.

 ${\cal L}$ is a modal/intuitionistic logic of your preference (for simplicity).

Definition

A Π_2 -rule is a triple (Γ , F, ϕ) such that:

- 1. $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\}$ is a set of \mathcal{L} -formulas;
- 2. *F* is a (possibly empty) set of propositional variables occurring in Γ but not in ϕ .

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,When F is omitted, we write $F(\Gamma)$ to mean this set F. Suggestively:

 $\forall \overline{p}_{\overline{p} \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi.$

Definition

If (\mathcal{A}, v) is an algebraic model, we write $(\mathcal{A}, v) \models \forall \overline{p}_{\overline{\rho} \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi$ to mean: if for all valuations v' differing from v at most in $F, v'(\psi) = 1$ for each $\psi \in \Gamma$, then $v(\phi) = 1$.

$\Pi_2\text{-rule}$ Systems and Inductive Rule Classes

One can develop the notion of a " $\Pi_2\text{-rule}$ system" by extrapolating from the standard case. We say that Σ is such if:

- (Monotonicity) $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$ then for any finite Γ' and S, we have $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in S \cup F}(\Gamma, \Gamma') \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$;
- (Bound Structurality) if $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in F} \Gamma \vdash \psi \in \Sigma$ and σ is a substitution leaving all variables in *F* fixed, and such that *p* does not occur in $\sigma(q)$ for $q \notin F$, then $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in F} \sigma[\Gamma] \vdash \sigma(\psi) \in \Sigma$
- (Renaming) If $\forall \overline{p}, q_{p \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$, then if Γ' is Γ with all instances of q replaced by $r, \forall \overline{p}, r_{p \in F} \Gamma' \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$.

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- (Strong Reflexivity) For all sets Γ , and F a set of propositional letters, and $p_0, ..., p_n \in F$, and $\phi \in \Gamma$, we have $\forall \overline{q}_{q \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi[\overline{\psi}/\overline{p}] \in \Sigma$, for ψ_i formulas not containing any variables from F.
- (Rule Cut) If $F = \{p_0, ..., p_n\}$ and $G = \{q_0, ..., q_k\}$ and $\Gamma(\overline{p}, \overline{r})$ is a collection of formulas, and $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in F} \Gamma \vdash \mu_i(\overline{q}, \overline{r}) \in \Sigma$ where $\Delta = \{\mu_i(\overline{q}, \overline{r}) : i \leq n\}$ is a finite set of formulas; and $\forall \overline{q}_{q \in G} \Delta \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$ is a rule, where no variable in *G* appears free in Γ , then $\forall \overline{p}_{p \in F} \Gamma \vdash \phi \in \Sigma$.

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Using a Lindenbaum-Tarski style argument we can prove:

Theorem (Completeness Theorem for Inductive rules)

Let Σ be a Π_2 -rule system. Suppose that $\Gamma/^2 \phi \notin \Sigma$. Then there is some algebra H, such that $\mathcal{H} \models \Sigma$, and $\mathcal{H} \nvDash \Gamma/^2 \phi$.

This raises the question: what is a "variety" or a "quasivariety" in this setting?

Definition

Given two algebras $\mathcal{A} \leq \mathcal{B}$, we say that this is a \forall -subalgebra if for each equation $\phi(\overline{x}, \overline{y})$ in the language \mathcal{L} and $\overline{a} \in \mathcal{A}$:

$$\mathcal{A} \vDash \forall \overline{x} \phi(\overline{x}, \overline{a}) \implies \mathcal{B} \vDash \forall \overline{x} \phi(\overline{x}, \overline{a}).$$

A class K of algebras is called an inductive class if it is closed under ultraproducts, products and \forall -subalgebras.

For example: any subdirect product is a \forall -subalgebra.

With some minimal adaptations from Mal'tsev's theorem we get:

Theorem

Let K be a class of algebras. Then the following are equivalent:

- 1. K is an inductive rule class.
- 2. K is axiomatised by ($\forall \exists$ -Special Horn) first-order formulas of the form:

$$\forall \overline{x} (\forall \overline{y} (\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i}(\overline{x}, \overline{y})) \rightarrow \psi(\overline{x}))$$

3. K is $\mathbb{IS}_{\forall}\mathbb{P}_{U}\mathbb{P}^{fin}(K')$ for some class of algebras K'.

Using these results, we can prove a basic algebraic completeness result:

Corollary

There is a dual isomorphism, Ind, between the lattice of Π_2 -rule systems, and the lattice of inductive rule classes of \mathcal{L} -algebras.

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Upshot: We can use tools of universal algebra and algebraic logic to look at the structure of Π_2 -rules and logically interesting questions herein.

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Upshot: We can use tools of universal algebra and algebraic logic to look at the structure of Π_2 -rules and logically interesting questions herein.

As a case study we concentrate on Gödel algebras:

 $\mathsf{LC} := \mathsf{IPC} \oplus (p \to q \lor q \to p).$

Example

The density rule of Takeuti and Titani:

$$\forall q(p \rightarrow q) \lor (q \rightarrow r) \lor c \vdash (p \rightarrow r) \lor c.$$

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Example

Given the formulas *bcn*

$$bc_n = p_0 \lor p_0 \to p_1 \lor \ldots \lor p_0 \land \ldots \land p_{n-1} \to p_n.$$

We can consider the rule $\forall p_0, ..., p_n bc_n \vdash \bot$.

This rule works like an anti-axiom: it corresponds to the dual Kripke frame having at least n + 1 points.

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- 1. (Gödel, 1933, Dummett, 1959) The lattice of subvarieties of Gödel algebras is countable with order type ω + 1.
- (Dzik & Wronski, 1973) Every subquasivariety of Gödel algebras is already a variety.
- 3. (Beckmann, Goldstern, Preining, 2008) There are countably many first-order Gödel logics.
- 4. (Baasz, 1998) On the other hand, when looking at potentially infinitary systems of Gödel logic, there are continuum many such systems.

What about inductive classes?

Let $X = \{[n] : n \in \omega\}$ be a set containing all *n*-element chains.

Let λ_n be the equation defining the variety generated by the *n*-element chain. Then for each chain [m], $[m] \models \lambda_n$ if and only if $m \le n$.

Theorem

For each subset $Y \subseteq X$, $\mathbb{IR}(Y)$ forms a distinct inductive rule class. Hence there are 2^{\aleph_0} many inductive rule classes.

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Proof: Suppose that $Y \neq Z$. Let $[n] \in Y \notin Z$. Assume that $[n] \in I\mathbb{R}(Z)$. Then [n] is a a \forall -subalgebra of an ultraproduct of finite products of elements from Z (by model theoretic completeness).

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Say that $[n] \leq \forall \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{H}_i/U$; then $\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{H}_i/U \models \lambda_n$ because it a \forall -subalgebra. By Los theorem, then for ultrafilter many $i, \mathcal{H}_i \models \lambda_n$. So if $\mathcal{H}_i \cong \prod_{i=1}^n [k_i]$ we have that $[k_i] \models \lambda_n$, so $k_i \leq n$. Since $[n] \notin Z$, then for $k = \max(\{k \in Z : k < n\})$ we have that $[k_i] \models \lambda_k$. But then $\mathcal{H}_i \models \lambda_k$. Since this holds for ultrafilter many $i, \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{H}_i/U \models \lambda_k$, which implies that $[n] \models \lambda_k$, a contradiction.

In fact, one can construct explicit rules separating, for instance [3] from [2]:

 $\forall q(\neg \neg q \rightarrow q \lor p) \vdash p.$

This rule can be falsified in 2, by taking p = 0, but it cannot fail in 3. The problem here seems to be that finite algebras become very separated when looking at inductive classes.

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One might then expect that the structure of such classes is hopeless. But it seems it is still possible to say interesting things.

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More precisely we can even characterise all extensions of LC which are "inductively structurally complete" – where all Π_2 -rules which are admissible are derivable:

Theorem

An inductive rule class is inductively structurally complete if and only if it is of the form $\mathbb{IR}([n])$ or $\mathbb{IR}([\mathbb{Q}])$.

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This turns out to depend on a nice structure theorem for algebras and ∀-subalgebras.

Some natural questions follow, both in the seting of LC and elsewhere:

- How do model completions interact with these rules?
- \cdot What can be said in general about admissibility of $\Pi_2\text{-rules}?$
- How do these rules relate to other interesting phenomena like implicit connectives?

Thank you! Questions?